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I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known, the International Law Commission (ILC)
decided in 1976 to include an article in its Draft Articles on State
Responsibility that makes a distinction between normal international
wrongful acts, which it called delicts, on the one hand, and exceptionally
grave breaches of international law which it called international crimes, on
the other hand. Thus, the ILC followed a suggestion made by its then
Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago, who, as soon as 1939, suggested such a
distinction.
The ILC maintained this distinction when it completed the first
reading of its draft last year, in spite of strong (and probably growing) and
passionate opposition, as this evening's debate will probably show.
However, it is my deep conviction that:
1. the distinction between what are called delicts and
what are called crimes answers an indisputable
need and must be maintained;
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2. the definition of crimes given in Article 19 of the
ILC draft articles is acceptable, although perhaps
unduly sophisticated;
3. the legal regime of these crimes as envisaged by
the ILC is debatable since the method adopted to
establish it has been grossly unsatisfactory; and
4. by way of conclusion, the word crime might be
misleading, but the concept is indispensable in
contemporary international law.
Let me take each of these four arguments separately.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DELICTS AND CRIMES ANSWERS AN
INDISPUTABLE NEED
Although part of the doctrine, lawyers (especially French
international lawyers) and some States (including France) challenge this
definition, the definition of responsibility deriving from Articles 1 and 3 of
the ILC draft can hardly be challenged. In the modern, post-Ago, meaning
of the term, responsibility is the situation resulting from an international
wrongful act committed by a subject of international law or attributable
(imputable if you prefer) to it.
Now, if this is so, it implies a differentiation in the legal regime of
responsibility. It is absolutely unacceptable to assimilate purely and simply
a genocide and an ordinary breach of international law, say a breach of
bilateral-trade agreement. Both are, indeed, international wrongful acts,
and both entail, therefore, the responsibility of their author. But it seems
obvious, evident, necessary, and indispensable that the consequences
deriving from each be clearly differentiated. And this is the case for a
very good reason. The breach of the trade agreement, even though
regrettable as any other violation of international law, only concerns the
relations between the two (or more) State parties to the treaties, while
genocide threatens international society as a whole, the very basis of the
still fragile international community.
If this is so, international lawyers will immediately have in mind
the celebrated dictum of the International Court of Justice in its famous
1970 Judgment in the Barcelona Traction case:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of States towards the international community
as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the
former are the concern of all States. In view of the
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importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest; they are obligations erga omnes.'
Can we infer from this that a crime is a violation of an obligation
erga omnes? Probably not, and this leads us to my second proposition.
III. THE DEFINITION OF CRIMES GIVEN IN ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH
2, OF THE ILC DRAFT IS ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY TOO
SOPHISTICATED
I recall this definition: An international wrongful act which results
from the breach by a State of an obligation so essential for the protection
of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as crime by that community as a whole constitutes an
international crime.
This definition involves clearly three elements: First, a crime is an
international wrongful act; on this, we all agree. Second, this
internationally wrongful act results from the breach of an international
obligation which is essential for the protection of fundamental interests of
the international community. Third, it must be recognized as a crime by
that community as a whole.
It is this last point which has attracted the biggest number of
opponents. To say so would make the whole notion uncertain and
subjective, all the more so as the very notion of international community
would itself be subject to uncertainty. With respect, this is simply rubbish.
Those who negate the concept of crime do not, as far as I know, contend
that custom does not exist or should not exist. However, custom can
hardly be said to be more precisely defined than crimes. It is, just to recall
the widely accepted formula of Article 38, paragraph l(b), of the Statute of
the ICJ evidence of a general practice accepted as law. This does not even
tell us who must accept the practice. At least Article 19 of the ILC draft
tries to give a precision; the international community as a whole must give
recognition.
And the formula is not that new. It has already been accepted in
Article 53 of the Vienna 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
defines jus cogens and only gives a supplementary precision by indicating
that the international community is the international community of states; if
this can help, let's include this in the second draft reading.
Now, does this mean that a crime is a breach of a peremptory
norm of general international law? In 1976, the ILC, still in accordance
with its Special Rapporteur, denied it for rather obscure theoretical
1. Barcelona Traction, I.C.J. 32 (1970).
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reasons. I would rather suggest that the real reasons for that were
prudential and political. Ago and the Commission were probably afraid
that affirming bluntly that a crime is a violation of a norm of jus cogens
would prevent wide acceptance of the concept of crime as a consequence of
the defiance against jus cogens in some circles and from certain States
(among which France was certainly the most decided opponent and is still
the most persistent objector).
More than twenty years later (and thirty years or so after the
drafting of the Vienna Convention), this caution seems no longer
necessary. If you leave Asterix (France) aside, no one seriously contests
anymore that norms of jus cogens have a real specificity among
international law rules and the past objections against the concept have
proved unfounded. The feared abuses have not occurred and, as has been
aptly written about peremptory norms, "the vehicle does not often leave
the garage. "'
I, therefore, urge that it would be easier and more convenient to
define an international crime as a breach of a norm of jus cogens. Indeed,
this would not, in fact, change the existing definition since all three
elements that I have noted would still exist:
1) a crime would still be an international wrongful act (a
breach);
2) the breach would still be of an essential obligation towards
the international community as a whole; and
3) the subjective (or psychological) element would still be
present since, according to the very definition of jus cogens, a
peremptory norm of general international law must be recognized
as such by the international community of States as a whole.
Let me open a parenthesis here. Bob Rosenstock has complained
in a recent interesting and most debatable article appearing in the ILC
book, published as a contribution to the United Nations decade for
international law that "the acceptance of the notion of jus cogens was
conditioned on . . . express acceptance of the role of the International
Court of Justice, while there is no comparable institution for denominating
certain actions as criminal. " 3 Very well. This is precisely why, at my
suggestion, the Commission sought to include an article in the draft which
would have been copied on Article 66 of the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties and would have provided for the compulsory jurisdiction
2. IAN BROWNLIE, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 10 (1988)
3. International Law on the Eve of the twenty-first Century-Views from the International
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. EIF97.V4272 (1997) ElF 97.V4, 272 (1997).
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of an arbitral tribunal or the ICJ in case of a dispute concerning the
existence of a crime. For obscure reasons, the Commission, while not
rejecting the proposal, has decided not to include it in the first draft and to
come back to it during its second reading. Curiously enough, I understand
(I was absent from the debate) that my friend, Bob Rosenstock, was among
the firmer opponents to such a provision.
One last word on this second point: if it is accepted that a crime is
a breach of a norm or jus cogens, couldn't it be said as well that it is a
breach of an erga omnes obligation? It might help in the sense that erga
omnes obligations are less contested than peremptory norms. However, I
have strong doubts since if all norms of jus cogens certainly are erga
omnes, there is no reciprocity, and one can think of many obligation erga
omnes, which could hardly be seen as deriving from peremptory norms.
Just to give an example, this is the case of the right of passage in
international straits or international canals.
This draws attention on something very important, which is,
exactly like peremptory norms, that crimes are to be extremely rare in the
present state of the world; the international community does exist, but the
solidarity on which it is based is still limited, which means that obligations
essential for the protection of its fundamental interests are unavoidably
very limited both in number and in scope. And in this respect, paragraph
3 of Article 19 of the ILC draft is far from convincing.
Paragraph 3 is the provision in which the ILC has endeavored to
give examples of crimes. I have no time to enter into a lengthy discussion
on this provision. Suffice it to say that: first, it is a bad method of
codification to give examples in a codification instrument; second, this
partial enumeration is all the more regrettable since it fixes rules which are
and must stay in constant evolution; and third, and above all, the examples
given are themselves highly debatable or, at least, too wide and imprecise.
But if there are grounds to delete this list of examples, this would not be a
reason to throw the baby out with the bath-water.
IV. THE LEGAL REGIME OF CRIMES ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLES 51 TO
53 OF THE ILC DRAFT IS UNCONVINCING (TO SAY THE LEAST)
I now come to my third proposition. Here again, I have no time to
explain in detail why the legal regime of crimes contemplated by the ILC
draft is subject to criticism. I have done it unfortunately in French, in my
own contribution to the ILC book for the United Nations decade of
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international law that I have just mentioned.' The main weaknesses of the
draft in this respect are twofold: on the one hand, the special
consequences attached to the commission of a crime are very limited and
cast doubt on the usefulness of the very notion of crimes itself; but, on the
other hand, the general consequences that the draft attaches to the delicts
are themselves too wide and include elements which should be limited to
the crimes.
Apparently these two criticisms are mutually exclusive. In fact
these defects are cumulative here and this is a result of the wrong method
followed by the ILC and its Special Rapporteur; Professor Arangio-Ruiz.
Let me explain briefly.
When he assumed his functions of Special Rapporteur, Professor
Arangio-Ruiz kept saying that he did not know what crimes could be and
he proposed, in his first report on the subject, in 1988, to focus on the
consequences of delicts, leaving for a later stage the codification of the
consequences of a crime. However, at the same time and very
unfortunately, the Special Rapporteur has drafted his reports as if the
distinction did not exist, taking his examples more than not in the field not
of delicts, but of crimes, and particularly studying the consequences of the
illegal use of force, a crime par excellence. In spite of some protests
(mainly from myself), the Commission has followed his suggestion and has
not challenged the examples he has given.
As a result, the consequences of an international wrongful act (that
is, in fact, of delicts) exposed in Articles 41 to 46 of the draft include
several consequences which are (or should be) limited to crimes, such as
punitive damages in Articles 42, paragraph 2, and 45, paragraph 2 (c) or
the obligation for the State which has committed the international wrongful
act to give assurances or guarantees of non-repetition contemplated in
Article 46. This is even more true for the rules applying to counter-
measures in Articles 47 to 50. They are well fitted to crimes but
absolutely unacceptable as far as simple delicts are concerned since they
facilitate much too much recourse to counter-measures, a means of
reacting to internationally wrongful acts, which, by the nature of things, is
reserved to powerful States. I can understand that the United States (and
my friend Bob Rosenstock) are very enthusiastic about them; Chad is not;
nor am I!
A consequence of this excessive severity against simple delicts is
that, when the Commission arrives, at last, at the consequences of crimes,
which, as the Commission rightly says in Article 51, must be added to all
4. ALLAIN PELLET, VIVE LE CRIME! REMARQUES SUR LES DEGRES DEL'ILLICITE EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 287-315.
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the other consequences of any other internationally wrongful act, not much
can be added, and this explains the poor content of Articles 52 and 53.
However, this certainly does not mean that the concept of crime is
an empty shell. In the first place, as I have just tried to explain, several
consequences that the Commission draws from all 'international wrongful
acts should certainly be reserved to the sole crimes and do not apply to
simple delicts. In the second place, some very important consequences of
crimes have unfortunately been omitted from the draft. At least one of
these is what I would call the transparency of the State having committed a
crime. This means that when an international crime is committed, not only
the State itself is responsible, but also the natural persons who have
decided, committed, planned, directed, incited, etc. such a crime.
An important warning is necessary here. I do not mean that a
crime by a State and a crime against peace and security of mankind are a
sole and unique notion. What I mean is, simply, that when a crime in the
meaning of Article 19 of the draft on State responsibility is committed,
then, and only then, can the individual responsibility of the individuals
concerned be entailed. This explains why, according to Article 7 for the
draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, the official
position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and
security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does
not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.
Now, the responsibility of the individual through whom the State
has committed the crime is obviously a penal or criminal responsibility,
but what about the responsibility of the State itself? To answer this
question, I come to my fourth and last proposition.
V. THE WORD CRIME MIGHT BE MISLEADING, EVEN THOUGH THE
CONCEPT IS DEFINITELY INDISPENSABLE IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In order not to exceed my time too much, I'll try to make my point
briefly.
I am among those who think that States can be held criminal in a
sense which is close to the penal meaning of the term. Nazi Germany or
Sadam Hussein's Iraq can be called criminal States and have been treated
as such by the international community.
This being said, I am also among those who think that, in
international law, analogies with domestic law are rarely helpful and
usually misleading. International responsibility is neither civil nor penal; it
is simply international. It is the least penal of all since, within the State,
penal responsibility presupposes the existence of tribunals, which have
1998]
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jurisdiction to establish it, a condition which is not fulfilled in international
law. Hence, my firm conviction that the word delict to designate simple
international wrongful acts is particularly inappropriate.
Now, what about the word crime? For the reasons I have just
explained, it seems less shocking than the word delicts. After all, when a
State breaches an international obligation essential for the interests of the
international community as a whole, it never acts by chance or
unintentionally. Therefore, the elements of intent and fault, which are not
necessarily present in other international wrongful acts, are part of the
crimes exactly as they are part of penal infractions in domestic laws.
Moreover, even without a judge, the reactions of the international
community to a crime clearly include punitive aspects.
However, this is not terribly important for me. The word crime is
defensible as it has acquired its legitimacy since 1976 and is very widely
used. Now if the analogy with domestic law seems really excessive and
repulsive, it may be abandoned. But the reality will remain, as I said at
the beginning of this statement, a genocide cannot be compared with a
breach of a trade agreement; it is different in kind, by its very nature. Call
it breach of peremptory norm or violation of an essential obligation, or call
it butterfly or abomination. The fact remains, we need a concept and a
name for this concept!
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